The baker of last resort and his critics
Provisioning food was a concern for most local and central governments in pre-industrial Europe. Public granaries sought to stabilise prices by strategic purchases when prices were low and by disbursements to urban and rural wage-earners when prices soared. Most governments were also involved in the regulation of foreign trade, imposing export bans and/or stimulating imports of grain when it was in short supply. These ad hoc bans were usually lifted when harvest outcomes and prices returned to normal. Price volatility caused by disruptions in the grain supply imposed large temporary changes in consumption on urban and rural wageearners and therefore posed a threat to the political order. Those advocating grain supply regulation were aware of the fact that they were continuing a tradition that reached back to antiquity. 1 Attempts at stabilising grain supply were given a new lease of life with urban growth in medieval Europe. Those attempts grew out of local concerns, but gradually became identified with the nation-state. The most ambitious centralised systems of food provisioning developed in France under Colbert and in Prussia under Frederick the Great. In England these policies were gradually disbanded from the end of the seventeenth century on, but on the Continent they continued in full force well into the eighteenth century. The remark -made by a historian (Steven Kaplan) of the ancien régime -that the king was 'the baker of last resort' was not far off the mark.
However, these traditional grain policies began to be challenged, both 1 11 See N. Delamare, Traité de la police, Paris: P. Cot, 1710-29.Delamare was a contemporary with an impressive knowledge of the 'police' in general and bread and subsistence problems in particular. In his monumental work, book V is devoted to subsistence policies. For France he traces it back to Charlemagne who in 809 banned peasants selling 'en vert' that is, before harvest. Delamare sides with the customary intepretation, arguing that the king's concern was for the peasants who would otherwise be exploited, having no means to support themselves and therefore in a weak bargaining position before harvest. Vol 2, p. 682.
politically and theoretically, from the mid-eighteenth century. The idea that price and consumption stability was a desirable state of affairs was not at stake. It was now argued, however, that price stability was best accomplished by free trade in a world where supply shocks were local but cancelled out globally. Barriers to internal and international trade and the restrictions on entry into the trading professions fostered administrative abuse and obstructed the forces of competition. International and interregional trade were seen as the best means of attaining equilibrium between local excess supplies and deficits. A coherent system of liberal ideas, with a strong but not exclusive focus on grain markets, first developed in mid-eighteenth century France, within a few years it had spread to almost every corner of Europe. In nations such as England, where grain markets were already fairly liberalised, debate on the merits of free trade also unfolded, because the advocates of regulation tried to revive the old legislation when grain prices soared in the final decades of the eighteenth century. The advocacy of free internal and external trade, respect for private property, including that in stocks of grain, and the belief in the unrestrained forces of competition, were all ideas associated with the Physiocratic school of economics in France. Yet apart from a shared passionate concern for agriculture, upholders of these ideas had no conceptual or logical connection with other aspects of that body of thought. Nor did Physiocratic thinking much influence them. Indeed, important elements of the new liberal ideology were carried over to the Physiocrats by the 'proto-liberalism' developing in Europe in the eighteenth century. In Prussia -which in other respects was open to Enlightenment -the new ideas gained momentum a little later and by then Physiocratic liberalism had been replaced by the 'Smithian' variety. In England the defence of deregulated grain markets was only marginally influenced by Physiocratic thought, though it was anticipated by another Smith: the English pamphleteer Charles Smith.
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This chapter reviews some of the outstanding contributions of the French Enlightenment and its forerunners inside and outside France and then draws attention to similar intellectual currents in other parts of Europe. The political impact of this intellectual assault on the old régime will be discussed in the concluding chapter 6.
One swallow does not bring the summer. But half a century or more before the mid-century assault, Pierre de Boisguilbert, a local official In France, the traditional concern for regional self-sufficiency had bred an intricate system of barriers to inter-regional trade. It was this state of affairs that became one of the main targets of Boisguilbert's critique. Systematic criticism, however, gained momentum by the middle of the eighteenth century and dominated the intellectual scene in Paris in the 1760s with its discussion societies, its pamphleteers and its reform-minded journals. However, Boisguilbert's Le detail de la France,ou la France ruinée sous la règne de Louis XIV, first printed in Cologne in 1696, introduced themes later to be picked up by the Physiocrats and other liberals. These included radical opposition to market regulation, the idea that grain prices in France were too low because of the isolation of the French market and that price volatility stemmed from a segmentation of the French market which ultimately imposed disincentive effects on producers' efforts. 4 Boisguilbert's booklet is remarkable for its stringent analysis and modernity. A little later, in the 1730s, and under Boisguilbert's influence, the Tuscan writer Salustio Bandini produced another liberal manifesto, Discorso sopra la Maremma di Siena, but the Discorso circulated only privately until it was published in 1775, fifteen years after its author's death. 5 However, Bandini's influence outlived him and his text later influenced the reform of the grain trade in Tuscany when local reformers popularised his ideas. Although Bandini belonged to the élite, as did most reform-minded activists in these years, his was a dissident voice defending a neglected part of Tuscany, la Maremma, the coastal region zone of Siena and around Grosseto, whose potential as a grain-exporting region was stifled, he argued, by rulers who wished to secure an exclusive and stable supply of cheap grain for Florence and Siena. That political intervention in grain markets led to artificially low prices and accompanying disincentive effects later became the standard liberal argument.
The deregulation debate gained momentum both in Tuscany and France in the 1760s, and the pathbreaking role played by Bandini in Tuscany was fulfilled by Claude-Jacques Herbert in France. Herbert Bread and Enlightenment 3 wrote two influential booklets Essai sur la police générale des grains, sur leur prix et sur les effets de l'agriculture (Berlin, 1755) and Observations sur la liberté du commerce des grains (Amsterdam, 1759) . He introduced a series of themes that would be refined -and sometimes vulgarised -in the following decade. The main theme was that only free grain trade can achieve price stability. Local price stability required exports in times of abundant harvests, moderating the decline in prices. In lean years imports would make price increases less violent than if a region had to rely exclusively on its own supplies. Free entry to the grain trade was vital because with many merchants excess profits in the grain trade would not prevail: they would be arbitraged away by competing merchants. 6 The administrative tradition of giving exclusive rights to some merchants -les marchands accredités -only caused monopoly profits, corruption and high prices.
7
The coherent articulation of the advantages of free intra-and international trade in grain was developed by the Physiocrats. Widely known at the time as les économistes, a term which had a derogatory ring to it in some quarters, these influential critics of intervention were close to, or part of, the ruling élite.
8 I will refer to them as les économistes for two reasons. The first is that the aspects of their intellectual universe discussed here are not those themes uniquely associated with Physiocratic thought, such as the idea of the 'sterility' of the non-agrarian classes. The second is that I wish to stress the collective character of the critique, even while singling out the outstanding individual accomplishment of the Frenchman A.R.J. Turgot. Furthermore I will concentrate on the laissez-faire policies advocated by les économistes, and the highly original rationale for these policies. That rationale was not conceptually or theoretically tied to Physiocratic ideology. In fact, a liberal position concerning grain trade was held else- Rivière (c. 1720-94) , among others. Although they were part of the Enlightenment, not all intellectuals associated with that current shared their views on the liberalisation of the grain trade. Voltaire ridiculed some of them for being narrowminded and flattered the contemporary critic of liberalisation, Ferdinando Galiani, as combining the minds of Plato and Molière. Diderot, the encyclopedian, was instrumental in getting Galiani's work published. Some of them -for example, Quesnay -as a physician at the Royal court, was at the very centre of power, and Turgot worked as an 'intendent' in the regional administration responsible for, among other things, tax collection and the administration of food supply. L. Rothkrug defended the view that the Enlightenment radicalism can be traced back to seventeenth-century opposition to 'Colbertism', see his Opposition to Louis XIV (1965) .
where in Europe and by people outside that school in France, such as Claude-Jacques Herbert. Nor was Turgot a dogmatic Physiocrat. Some even claim he paid only lip-service to physiocracy. 9 Be that as it may, Turgot and his associates made lasting contributions which were independent of their Physiocracy.
Most important, les économistes shifted the concern of economic policy from consumer protection to that of creating incentives for producers to increase production, which would -in the end -benefit consumers as well. The reason given for this optimistic conclusion was that the larger the normal harvest, the less devastating a future poor harvest -defined as a given proportional deviation from a normal harvest -would be.
10
Despite the radicalism of their project -a complete liberalisation of a hitherto tightly regulated grain trade -they influenced legislation inside and outside France from the 1760s onwards. Hitherto, France had been a country of segmented regional markets, but in 1763 and 1764 internal barriers to trade were abolished -although Paris was still granted privileged access to its hinterland -and foreign trade was partly liberalised. Alas for this experiment, it coincided with a period of bad harvests, which produced the expected popular unrest, and paved the way for a return to the old regulative policies in the early 1770s. There were frequent allegations from les économistes that local administrations had sabotaged the liberal legislation and thus contributed to the defeat of grain trade liberalisation.
11 The intellectual scene changed by the end of the 1760s, exhibiting an increasing hostility towards les économistes; but the liberal intelligentsia was not purged from the highest levels of administration. In the mid-1770s Turgot moved from the provincial administration that he had served from the early 1760s, Limoges, to the centre. As Controlleur Général he reintroduced free trade, though again without much luck in the face of natural calamities. Turgot was soon ousted and the liberal legislation was not revived -and then, again, only for a short spell -until the French Revolution.
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The debate in these turbulent years provoked a response from adherents of the traditional management of food supply, and the dispute was in a sense a very modern one. On the one hand, there was the elegant and sometimes arrogant abstraction of les économistes and, on the other hand, the down-to-earth reasoning of their adversaries. While the former discussed how markets worked in principle and showed the force of deductive reasoning, the latter concentrated on the many imperfections and the problems of a 'big bang' transition to a market economy when much of the needed infrastructure was lacking. 13 Faced with these problems les économistes were not entirely at a loss, however. First of all, they blamed poor harvests rather than middlemen; secondly, they blamed the reluctance of many regional parliaments and local authorities to follow the new liberal instruction. Finally, they stressed the ambiguities of the 1763-64 legislation, specifically the legal uncertainties surrounding international trade.
14 This problem was admitted by Jacques Necker, a spokesman for the opposing camp (see n. 13), who replaced Turgot as Controlleur Général. As an administrator Turgot, the most brilliant thinker among les économistes, had shown great skill and compassion in handling the subsistence crisis in Limoges. He was in no way insensitive to the distress caused by a bad harvest, but nonetheless true to his liberal convictions when he bombarded the royal court with demands for support for his poverty-stricken region. 15 Rather than working against the market he Although les économistes only temporarily influenced legislation in their intellectual heyday, they had a lasting impact. As a consequence of their penetrating critique the adherents of regulation moderated their policy proposals and abandoned their belief in a strict and comprehensive regulation of markets. They ended up advocating a mixed-economy approach with a balance of state regulation and market principles. However this effort was based more on common sense and pragmatic thinking, and did not stimulate the intellectual rigour and theoretical innovations for which les économistes should rightly be remembered.
A theory of price stabilisation
The contribution of les économistes to the analysis of the process of price formation in grain markets had several original features which have not as yet been sufficiently appreciated. One of these accomplishments was the claim that price volatility created not only welfare losses for consumers, which was part of the traditional motive for the management of food supply, but also had disincentive effects on investment and effort in agriculture. The critics made price volatility a prime cause for the distressed state of agriculture. But their theory of price formation boldly suggested that the volatility was unnecessary. Price fluctuations could be tempered provided that an adequate institutional innovation was permitted.
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Their best and favoured remedy against price fluctuations was market integration, and its prerequisite was free trade in grain.
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The arguments developed to underpin these strong and, for contemporaries, unconventional views formed a fairly consistent set of propositions. Deviations from normal price reflected uncontrollable supply or output shocks. The key issue was how markets might mitigate the effect of Economic Journal, 102, 1992, pp. 197-210 , in which it is argued that these early economists were less hostile to state intervention than usually believed. 16 See Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action, part 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 17 L.-P. Abeille makes that point most explicitly by asserting that famines were actually products of institutional failures, including misconceived governmental regulation, rather than a lack of grain. See his Faits qui ont influencé sur la cherté des grains en France & Angleterre, 1768, also in JE, July and August 1768. 18 Les économistes also adhered to a natural right argument against governmental infringements on private access to own property. That included the right to trade grain at any price.
such shocks on prices. The explanation offered focused on supply rather than demand shocks -rightly so, given the income and price inelasticity of demand. However, it was assumed that these supply shocks were local, in the sense that if one nation or region had a disastrous harvest there was always some other nation or region that had a bumper one. The idea was made quite explicit and amounted to the argument, using modern jargon, that natural shocks -accidents -to local harvests were independent, normally distributed and with a zero mean. For example, it was stressed that a similar natural shock, such as an increase in humidity, might cause very different responses -some favourable, some deficient -in different parts of Europe, because of differing soil conditions. So even in the unlikely event that the whole of Europe was experiencing a similar change in weather conditions, the impact on the aggregate harvest need not be great because local effects would cancel out. The general belief was that harvest disturbances were caused by a multitude of factors -par milles raisons de tout genre -which differed locally. As a consequence, in a large area such as Europe the aggregate harvest did not change much from one year to the next. 19 This being the case, the local dearth was an institutional failure caused by inadequate trade. The point made was not only an abstract idea that les économistes pursued. There were frequent references to different outcomes at any one time in Tuscany, in France or in parts of it and in the Baltic area to the effect that 'les accidents se compensent entre les Royaumes'. The merits of free grain trade were often evoked by the example of Holland, which had a reputation for stable prices. 20 This line of thought was also present in the economic debates in other countries, of course, although it was developed with more rigour in France. 21 It should come as no surprise that Adam Smith later dwelt upon the peculiarities of local harvest shocks cancelling out in a large nation, in the digression on the corn trade in The Wealth of Nations. More interestingly, however, the argument also crops up almost a century earlier in the English economist, C. Davenant. Davenant observed that 'we enjoy the benefits of such different soils, viz. High Lands and Low Lands, where one hits when the other fails' 22 and a stable price would reign if these markets were permit- reflects the inertia of tradition. What was at stake here was not the deregulation of grain markets but rather the defence of a reasonably liberal status quo from attempts to revive the old legislation against 'regrating, engrossing and forestalling'. There was, however, in England as on the Continent a widespread sentiment that 'the present dearness must be owing to the wicked combination of the forestallers'. 28 Others pointed out that the number of sellers was so great that combination could not persist for long periods.
29 But there were also the numerous pamphlets by liberals such as Charles Smith and Arthur Young. The former opposed public intervention in much the same way as his French contemporaries did. He believed in the price-stabilising effect of intertemporal 'transport' of grain and therefore defended the private hoarding of large farmers because it served 'at their own private Expence the same purpose as public Magazines, and without ill Consequences which might attain such Magazines'. 30 A similar argument had been anticipated by Davenant, who was in favour of publicly subsidised private granaries to stabilise prices. The private gains were motivated by the services rendered by private granaries, in his view. 31 On both sides of la Manche a much more positive assessment of the merits of markets and competition had developed during the eighteenth century, especially its latter half. The simultaneous existence of deficit and surplus regions provided the rationale for trade and the multitude of merchants involved in gainful arbitrage effectively arrested the abuse of market power. Market regulation was not necessary for price stability to obtain, in fact it could be counter-productive. This in a nutshell was the new ideology, and it was repeated, rephrased, and reinterpreted to suit local audiences all over Europe by the likes of a Verri in Milan or a Kryger in Stockholm. 
